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Introduction
Climate Change: a Global Threat and a Global Responsibility
Since the Industrial Revolution, increased emissions, deforestation, and other
environmental degradations resulting from human activity have caused carbon dioxide
and other pollutants to accumulate in the atmosphere. This accumulation has changed the
composition of the atmosphere altering the earth’s carbon cycle. The accumulated
carbon and other pollutants, collectively known as greenhouse gasses, trap infrared
radiation (heat energy) causing the planet to warm up in a phenomena known as global
warming. Over the past 50 years the average global temperature has increased at the
fastest rate in recorded history, making 2014 and 2015 the hottest years on the historical
record1. Research and climate modelling by the Hadley Center and numerous other
research centers definitively indicates that the global rise in average temperature is the
direct result of human activity not natural climate cycles. If no action to counter this trend
is taken, the concentration of greenhouse gasses could become double that of preindustrial levels, and temperatures could rise by as much as 5°C by 20502. In addition to
an increase in global temperature, climate change could also affect regional precipitation
variability, sea levels and increase the frequency of extreme weather events. These
climatic impacts pose serious threats food production, access to water, human and
ecological health, and economic development
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Global warming is an international issue with broad effects but, it is important to
note that the effects of global warming will not be experienced equally by all nations.
Developing countries will suffer the most from climate change even though, historically,
these countries have contributed the least to carbon emissions. Already located in the
warmest regions of the earth where rainfall is the most variable, developing countries’
weather patterns will be the most profoundly impacted by global warming. This is
particularly harmful to developing countries because developing economies are the least
diversified and the most heavily reliant on the climate-sensitive industries namely,
agriculture, fishing, and tourism3. In a report prepared for the Pew Center on Global
Climate Change, Ian Burton of the University of Toronto estimated that between 1984
and 2003 the costs of global warming in developing countries were three times higher
than in higher income countries4. Compounding the problem, these most vulnerable
countries also possess the least means of adapting to the effects of global warming.
Developing countries tend to lack the institutions, the funds, and the technology to
properly implement mitigation and adaptation programs or adjust their economies to face
the worst effects of climate change.
Given the unfair cost burden climate change places on developing countries, it is
reasonable that much of the burden of mitigation rests on the shoulders of developed
countries. The “polluter pays” principle of responsibility and social justice insists that
developed countries must account for their historical roles as the greatest polluters. This
does not mean, however, that all climate change mitigation actions must take place within
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developed countries. Due to rapid economic growth, a lack of clean, fuel-efficient
technology, and increased venturing into carbon intensive industries, developed
countries’ levels of greenhouse gas emissions are increasing rapidly. The World Energy
Outlook projects that by 2030 developing countries will account for over three-quarters of
the projected increase in greenhouse emissions5. It is therefore imperative that emission
reductions take place across all quarters of the globe. Developed countries have the
opportunity to offer financing options to lower income nations to support mitigation
efforts. Fortunately, the lower mitigation costs in developing countries tend to be less
than in developed countries that have already adopted the easiest, most cost-effective
mitigation measures. Significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions can be achieved
relatively inexpensively by targeting the cheapest, most easily implementable options
first.
Carbon Trading: an Integral Part of the Climate Change Solution
Having established the urgent necessity of coordinated global action against
climate change, the pertinent question facing the international community is: what
mitigation measures should be adopted and how? Many different approaches for climate
change mitigation exist but, one of the most interesting potential methods is carbon
trading, through either cap and trade schemes or offsetting programs. In general, a cap
and trade scenario works by setting a “cap” on the level of emissions an actor is allowed
to emit, and issue pollution permits to each actor allowing them to pollute only certain
amount. The actor can either 1) pollute less than their allotted amount of emissions, in
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which case they can sell their emissions credits to other actors or 2) be unable to meet the
emissions requirements and have to purchase emissions credits from a source polluting
below the allotted quota. Offsetting programs allow actors to purchase emissions credits
by financing emission reduction projects in areas outside of the capped zone, often in
developing countries. In either system, firms can make their own decisions on how much
pollution is worth to them. A firm with high costs of abatement might choose to continue
polluting but purchase emission credits from another firm or finance an emissions
reduction project in another country. As long as the emission credits purchased truly
reflect an accurate account of verified emission reductions, then the total number of
global emissions goes down and the emission cap is met at less cost. With emission
prices determined by market forces, rather than artificially selected (like in the case of a
carbon tax), the resulting carbon market equilibrium should represent the socially
optimum level of pollution.
While the theory behind carbon trading is sound, actually implementing trading
programs and developing the necessary infrastructure is extremely challenging. Since the
theory behind property rights-based emission trading was first articulated in the 1960s,
numerous emission trading systems have been developed on international, national, and
local levels. This paper will examine some of the more prominent emission trading
mechanisms and evaluate their effectiveness based on a range of criteria.
Evaluation Criteria
On the surface carbon trading schemes seem like the perfect solution to the global
climate change problem. Actors are free to make their own decisions about how to
Moors, 4

pursue emission abatement and are therefore free to choose the option that makes the
most financial sense for their firms. The multitude of carbon trading programs, however,
present firms with numerous avenues to pursue emission reductions. Each program has a
different way of approaching carbon trading and emission credits and it is difficult to
determine which program presents the most efficient pathway toward total emission
reduction. It is imperative that programs be objectively evaluated and compared in order
to determine which program presents the best, most efficient methods of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. In theory the most efficient carbon trading system would be
the one that achieves the most greenhouse gas emissions reductions at the least cost. A
benefit cost analysis could be run to determine the quantitative value of the emission
reductions achieved by the program less the program costs and the program with the
greatest benefit to cost ratio would stand on top. This simple concept is complicated,
however, by the diverse nature of costs and benefits that accumulate as a result of each
trading mechanism. In order to achieve a comprehensive evaluation of each trading
mechanism, this thesis will assess each program on the basis of the following criteria:
1. Environmental costs and benefits
Judging carbon trading mechanisms by their environmental benefits seems obvious
given their missions of achieving a certain amount of emission reductions. A clear
method of judging carbon trading mechanisms is determining the amount of
confirmed emission reductions resulting from the program, assigning a quantitative
value to the reduced emissions, and comparing that value to the associated costs.
Less obvious criteria for evaluation are the positive and negative externalities that
occur as a result of these programs. For example, one type of project eligible for
Moors, 5

emission credits in several of the carbon trading mechanisms is financing the creation
of a carbon sink by planting trees in an area affected by deforestation. If the project
well researched and properly executed, numerous side benefits can accrue to the
forest ecosystem. The newly planted forest could, in addition to absorbing carbon
dioxide, provide a habitat to animals whose homes were endangered by deforestation
and land use. It is possible, however, for poorly thought-out projects to cause
environmental harm. For example, if reforestation is carried out using non-native
trees, then the reforestation attempt could disrupt the native ecosystem launching a
chain reaction of unintended consequences.
2. Economic costs and benefits
Again, the economic costs of mitigation are very much a part of the public conscience
when it comes to thinking about carbon trading mechanisms. One of the most
important economic aspects of a carbon trading system to analyze is, whether the
price of a carbon unit in that particular system is an accurate reflection of the social
cost of a unit of carbon emission. Achieving equilibrium pricing is critical to the
success of a trading program because if prices are too low, then firms will be too able
to substitute emission reductions for carbon credits. A key idea behind carbon trading
as a system is that the flexibility in where emissions are cut results in lowers
abatement costs on the whole than command and control systems. However, carbon
trading systems can result in unintended economic externalities that must be taken
into account when performing a benefit-cost analysis of carbon trading systems.
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3. Social
There is always going to be some degree of tradeoff between abatement and the
consumption/ production of other normal goods. When implementing emission
reduction programs, the key is to know what tradeoffs you are willing to make. In
many cases, the people making the sacrifices for emissions reductions are the ones
who are least responsible for past emissions and the ones who will suffer the most
from the adoption of abatement measures. A key feature to examine in any emissions
reductions program is therefore what negative social impacts the program has on what
portion of the population. Program developers must keep in mind the issues of
fairness and equality in deciding who should bear the costs of abatement programs.
4. Institutional
While the criteria discussed above can be evaluated in a quantitative cost- benefit
way, carbon trading systems must also be judged by in a qualitatively to ensure
certain institutional variables are met. These institutional factors ensure that the
carbon trading programs run smoothly and achieve the quantifiable results measured
by the discussed criteria. The main institutional factors that will be examined in this
paper are transparency, accountability, and the ability of the program to respond to
changes or challenges.
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European Union Emissions Trading Scheme6
Description
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme is an emissions trading system
implemented by the European Union to comply with its Kyoto mandated emissions
targets. Composed of 25 participating countries and affecting some 12,000 firms, the EU
ETS is the largest program of its kind implemented to date. Enacted in 2005, the EU
ETS is currently entering its third phase. Phase I lasted from 2005 to 2007 and was
considered a trial phase. Lacking reliable data on industry emissions, the EU in Phase I
allowed Member States to allocate emissions credits based on firms’ own estimates of
historical emissions. Emission data collected from Phase I was then used to implement
stricter emission targets, enact higher penalties for noncompliance, and allow state
auctioning of emission credits during Phase II (2008-2013). Currently in Phase III (20132020), the EU ETS operates under improved rules and a stricter emissions cap to ensure
Kyoto compliance.
Operationally, EU Member States achieve Kyoto compliance by a combination of
two programs- the EU ETS and the Effort Sharing Decision (ESD). The EU ETS sets a
hard cap on emissions, but only applies to certain industries and covers only 45 percent of
total EU greenhouse gas emissions7. Firms in affected industries are assigned a certain
number of one ton EU carbon allowances (EUAs) based on their industry, size, and
historical emissions. The firm can then either pollute above or below that allowance. If a
6 Because the EU ETS does not adopt sustainable development as a stated program goal and the countries
directly participating in the EU ETS mechanism are not as vulnerable as developing countries, the social
impacts of the EU ETS will not be examined at length in this chapter
7
"The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)." European Commission
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firm polluted above the allowance, it can either buy emissions credits or pay a steep
penalty. If a firm polluted below its target, it could sell its left-over emissions credits on
the free market. Emissions permits are held in one of the EU ETS registries. Firms can
open an account by applying on the relevant Member State website that keeps track of the
number of permits assigned to each Member State, the allocation of permits to registered
firms, and the transfer of credits between firms. The Community Independent
Transaction Log records and authorizes all transactions that take place between EU ETS
accounts8. To achieve the remaining emissions reductions necessary to meet Kyoto
targets, Member States use ESD to decide how to divide emission allocations amongst
other industries. Industries regulated by ESD can achieve compliance using the same
emission credits trading mechanisms as industries regulated by the ETS. These
mechanisms include purchasing emissions credits from the EU ETS market, international
project credits from other Kyoto mechanisms and, carbon sink credits from the Land Use
Land Use Changes and Forestry (LULUCF) division. Under each phase of the EU ETS,
Member States’ emissions caps are lowered making emission credits more expensive and
increasing the costs of pollution. In this way, the EU decreases its emissions over time to
achieve Kyoto compliance while maintaining flexibility in how emission reductions are
achieved.
Assessing the Environmental Impact
Designed as a “learn by doing” pilot without a specific reduction commitment, phase
I (2005- 2007) of the EU ETS achieved, depending on the metric, a decrease in carbon
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emissions of 120 million to 300 million metric tons. This amounts to an overall decrease
of 2 to 5 percent below business as usual standards9. While this seems small, it is
important to keep in mind the original goal of phase I was not to realize a certain level of
emissions reductions, but to put a price on carbon and establish the institutional basis for
a successful carbon trading system10. Building on the foundations laid out in the phase I
period, phase II (2005-2012) succeeded in reducing carbon emissions by 11.5 percent
during the phase11. This means that the EU has met its treaty obligation for its first
commitment period (2008-2012) of an 8 percent reduction below 1990 levels. With these
reductions already in place, the program is currently on track to meet its 2020 emissions
targets of a 20 percent reduction compared to 1990 levels. Current estimates project
emissions to be 24 percent lower in 2020 than they were in 1990. Looking beyond 2020,
however, the EU is not projected to reach its 2030 emissions target of 40 percent below
1990 levels. Taking into account only the current measures implemented, the EU total
GHG emissions are estimated to be only 27 percent below 1990 levels in 203012. This
does not necessarily mean that the EU cannot implement new measures (with already in
the pipeline) to bridge the gap.
The chief related issues that must be addressed moving forward are the structural
imbalance between supply and demand for allowances and the consistently low carbon
spot price. Establishing the right EUA price is of critical importance to long term success
of the EU ETS. The price of the EUAs should be high enough that firms are incentivized

9
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to reduce their carbon emissions to avoid the costs of purchasing EUAs, but not so high
that it is in the best interests of the firms to relocate to a country/ region without
restrictions on carbon emissions. The primary determining factor of the price of EUAs is
the relationship between the supply of allowances (based on the size of the current cap
and the amount of allowances left over from the previous periods) and the demand for
carbon emissions. Simplistically, the greater the demand relative to the supply of
allowances, the higher the spot price of carbon. The situation facing the EU is one of a
high supply of allowances relative to demand and a resulting low carbon price. This state
of affairs began in phase I, when a lack of data on the historical emissions of firms and
the tendency for Member States to bargain and exaggerate to ensure their industries
received more free allocations caused an over-allocation of emissions credits by four
percent13. The over-allocation of emissions led to a carbon spot price of almost zero in
2007 and a stagnating carbon market.
Fortunately, the structure of the EU ETS system allows for some degree of selfcorrection between periods. One method of ensuring a fresh start between periods, was
the rule that surplus EUAs from phase I could not be transferred to the second phase of
the scheme (within phases, firms were allowed to let surplus credits from one year to be
used in subsequent years). This meant that at the beginning of phase II, firms were
subject to a new emissions cap determined by the emissions data from phase I, that was
6.5 percent14 lower than in 2005. Member States in this phase were also required to
develop National Allocation Plans (NAPs) laying out, in greater detail than in phase I, the

13
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amount of allowances the state intended to issue to emitting sectors. These plans then
needed to be approved by the European Commission increasing the regulatory
supervision and accountability of Member States and encouraging a more reasonable
distribution of EUAs to industries. Despite these measures, phase II did not see the
development of an efficient carbon market because of the global financial crisis of 2008.
In the wake of the crisis, EU market activity slowed and emissions dropped on average
10.48 percent in member countries between 2008 and 200915. This drop pushed total
emissions below the allotted cap so that, once again, the demand for emissions credits fell
below supply. Table 1 details the exact over allocation of allowances (in metric tons) that
occurred between 2008 and 2011.
Table 1: Total Supply- Demand
in Mt

2008

2009

2010

2011

Total

2076

2105

2204

2336

8720

2100

1860

1919

1886

7765

-24

244

285

450

955

Supply (issued allowances
and international credits)
Demand (reported
emissions)
Total Surplus of Allowances

Source: European Commission Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL), published on May 2, 2012

Overall, the Research Institute of Applied Economics in Barcelona estimates that
only between 21 to 23 percent of the abatement seen in the wake of the financial crisis

15
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was a result of policy actions by the EU ETS16. The rest of the 11.5 percent total
emissions abatement in phase II can be attributed to other factors. These factors include
the leftover allowances sold at the end of phase II, the early auctioning of 120 million of
phase 3 allowances in the 4th quarter of 2012, the inflow of credits from other trading
schemes, and, most notably, the economic slowdown from the financial crisis. It is
tempting to question the importance of locating the exact cause of emissions reductions.
As long as emissions are going down, does it matter whether the EU ETS is the cause?
The answer is yes. The same economic and social conditions cannot be relied upon to
occur again and to have the same emissions reducing outcomes in the future. Given that
it is the explicit goal of the EU ETS to promote emissions abatement “in a cost-effective
and economically efficient manner”17, a sacrifice in the form of a reduced economic
growth would not be worth the ensuing emissions reductions. The repeated over
allocation of emissions permits in phase II casts into doubt whether the EU can achieve
similar reductions while still growing economically and reflects poorly on the ability of
the European Commission to accurately judge the appropriate supply of carbon credits.
If the Commission continues this pattern of over allocation, the EU will almost certainly
fail to overcome its projected shortfall of the 40 percent reduction target in 2030.
Moving into the third stage of the EU ETS, the Commission submitted a report to the
European Parliament identifying the need to “tackle the structural supply-demand
imbalances”18 that led to the projected continuance of an oversupply of 2 million
emissions credits for a decade following the end of phase II. In order to address this
16
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disparity, the Commission implemented several measures to reduce the supply of
allowances in phase III and to create greater flexibility to dealing with external shocks to
the carbon market. The first of these measures to be put into action was the
postponement of the auction of 900 million allowances (400 million in 2014, 300 million
in 2015, and 200 million in 2016) until 201919. This “back-loading” of emissions credits
avoids increased in the EUA surplus that continued until 2013 giving the demand and
supply relationship time to become more balanced, the price of carbon to increase, and
for carbon market activity to take off. The “back-loading” of allowances is also expected
to act as a precursor for the establishment of Market Stability Reserve (MSR) as a more
long term solution. The Reserve will begin operating in January of 2019 and is designed
to automatically adjust the annual volume of emissions credits being auctioned if the
number of allowances in circulation exceeds the boundaries of a predefined range. The
MSR could either 1) add allowances to reserve from future auction volumes in response
to a market surplus of allowances greater than 833 million allowances or 2) take away
allowances from the reserve and add them to the auction market to prevent a deficit of
allowances if the total surplus is below 400 million allowances20. 100 million allowances
per year are set to be released from the MSR to ensure predictability and stability in the
carbon market. With the MSR mechanism, the EU ETS has a flexible means of directly
addressing supply and demand imbalances. This ability to add or take away allowances
from the market alleviates some of the burden of accurately divining supply and demand
on a given year- a skill that EU ETS planners clearly did not possess in phases I or II.
Finally, phase III also takes the step of applying a linear reduction factor to decrease the
19
20
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emissions cap on an annual basis to rectify the over-supply of EUAs. While previous
phase applied the same cap for the entire phase, in phase III, the cap is set to decrease by
1.74 percent, or by number of general mt allowances 38,264,246 each year. Taking the
linear reduction factor into account, emissions from fixed installations in 2020 are set to
be 21 percent lower than in 200521. In order to achieve the EU ETS’s longer term goal of
40 percent emissions reductions in 2030, the reduction factor is set to increase even
further in phase IV to 2.2 percent reduction each year. This is estimated to push
emissions reductions from fixed installations to 43 percent below 2005 levels overcoming
the projected shortfall of 13 percent. Between the “back-loading” measure, the
establishment of the MSR, and the application of the linear reduction factor to the
allowance cap, the EU ETS managed to achieve a balance between supply and demand in
2014 when demand slightly exceeded supply22 for the first time since 2008.
Reducing the size of the allowance surplus is not the only measure implemented by
the EU ETS in phase III to strengthen its environmental impact. The program is currently
in the process of moving from mostly free allocation of allowances to auctioning as a
default method. In phase II only four percent of distributed allowances were auctioned,
while the year 2013 of phase III saw the share of auctioned allowances at just over 40
percent23. This share is set to increase throughout phase III. The ratio of auctioned to
freely allocated allowances depends on the member state and the industry. A greater
proportion of allowances are freely allocated to eight developing states that have only
joined the EU since 2004 (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
21
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Lithuania, Poland and Romania). These states have committed to implementing national
plans to modernize and diversify their energy sectors and reduce reliance on more carbon
heavy fuels such as coal. Free allocation to firms in these countries is conditional on the
firms using the cost savings from free allocation to invest in the mandated
improvements24. On an industry basis, the EU ETS is focused on transitioning gradually
to primarily auctioned EUAs. In the power sector, all emissions credits are currently
allocated to plants via auctioning, with the exception of plants in the eight transitioning
member states discussed above. Firms in the manufacturing sector received 80 percent of
allowances for free in 2013 but, this portion is set to decrease to 30 percent in 202025. In
the aviation sector, only recently included in the EU ETS directive, 15 percent of
allowances are set to be auctioned. For other sectors included in the EU ETS directive,
the number of allowances auctioned is set to increase from an average of 40 percent to
over half by the end of phase III. The transition from free allocation to auctioning of
allowances fulfills the polluter pays principle of justice and ensures that the social cost of
carbon is integrated into firms’ business and financial decisions. Auctioning also serves
the practical purpose of creating an additional source of revenue for member states. In
2014, this revenue amounted to €3.2 billion26. The EU ETS directive mandates that at
least 50 percent of this revenue be reinvested in environmental or energy saving
measures. Many member states exceed this minimum requirement so that 87 percent (€3
billion) of auctioning revenue was directed for these purposes in 201427. Most of this

24
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investment was directed at energy efficiency measures, climate research, sustainable
infrastructure improvements, and research in clean technology.
Although many consider the EU ETS a failure due to the over allocations of
emissions credits in phases I and II, the scheme has actually succeeded in reducing total
emissions by 23 percent below business-as-usual standards in 201428. With the new
measures implemented for phase III, the amount of emissions reductions is set to increase
each year. This will ultimately serve to balance the EUA market.
Economic Impact
The main economic issue facing the EU from its emissions trading scheme is the
risk of carbon leakage. The term carbon leakage describes the potential phenomenon of
firms transferring production to other countries to avoid the prohibitive costs of being
subject to restrictive climate policies. This would be damaging to the economies of the
EU member states that lose businesses to less regulated countries and damaging to the
environmental goals of the EU ETS as firms simply relocate their emissions. Carbon
leakage has the potential to actually increase global emissions as firms make the energy
intensive moves to countries with laxer environmental policies where they might
establish production facilities that are less environmentally friendly than the originals.
With the move from free allocation to auctioned allowances in phase III, carbon leakage
becomes especially concerning as firms now face higher emissions costs than in previous
phases. The EU ETS is aware of the risk of carbon leakage, especially in carbon
intensive industries, and has created a list of at-risk firms and industries eligible to
28
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receive special treatment. Firms on this list will receive all, or a portion (depending on
their level of risk), of their allotted allowances via free allocation rather than having to
purchase their allowances at auction. This ensures that at-risk firms do not have to pay
prohibitive costs for their emissions while still holding them to the cap. If a firm on the
list exceeds the amount of emissions it is allocated, it does have to purchase additional
EUAs at auction. This list of eligible firms is updated every five years to reflect firms’
changing exposure to the leakage risk factors of firm costs of emission reduction and
level of exposure to trade outside the EU. Trade intensity outside the EU is an important
factor to consider because a firm could lose competitive advantage if it faces costs that
other firms that it is competing against do not because they are not subject to the
restrictions of the EU ETS. A firm or sector is eligible to be on the list if it faces at least
a five percent increase in production costs (direct or indirect) from implementing the EU
ETS directive and its trade intensity outside the EU is greater than ten percent.
Alternatively, a firm or sector is eligible if its additional costs are over a 30 percent
increase or its non-EU trade intensity is above 30 percent29. Some firms with multiple
product lines or divisions are eligible for the carbon leakage free allocation exemption for
some portions of its business but not others. In these cases, firms only receive a portion
of their emissions credits via free allocation depending on the percentage of their
business affected. To date, the EU ETS seems to have been extremely successful at
preventing carbon leakage and preventing a loss of regional competitiveness. The
London School of Economics estimates the impact of the EU ETS on EU global
competitiveness to be “extremely limited” and even more ambitious policies (such as
29
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increased auctioning or a higher carbon price) would cause exports to fall by only 0.5
percent and imports to rise by an extremely limited 0.07 percent30. As more and more
countries adopt increasingly stringent environmental policies, the risk of carbon leakage
continues to fall. Knowing this, the question now facing the EU is whether the measure
taken to counteract the threat of carbon leakage can now be scaled back to maximize the
environmental impact of the EU ETS. Currently, over 150 sectors representing 97
percent of industrial emissions in the EU are at least partially eligible for free
allocation31. At this point, free allocation acts as a kind of subsidy to heavy emitters
saving them from having to pay the increasing EUA price that lower emission firms are
subject to. The question of how to address free allocation is an issue that will be
addressed in phase IV (2021-2030).
Transparency
Transparency is of key importance to implementing a system like the EU ETS
because firms must make long-term business decisions based on the regulations imposed
on the carbon market. If firms are not aware of potential regulatory decisions by the
European Committee or the carbon allowance market is unpredictable, then firms cannot
effectively incorporate the cost of carbon into their investment decisions, and emission
reductions will not be achieved in a cost effective manner. To ensure transparency, the
EU ETS is diligent about providing notice on technical changes in the EU ETS and
publishing status reports on various features of the program. A key issue regarding
transparency is the 2013 change in reporting rules that no longer requires the EU
30
31
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Commission to report what type of credits firms use to meet their abatement obligations.
Instead, only the aggregate number of carbon credits is released32. This is concerning
because a large portion of the carbon credits firms can use (132.8 million in 2013) comes
from international offset programs such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
These programs do not necessarily have the same regulatory standards as the EU ETS
and can have drastic, unintended impacts on the lives of locals in the offset area. Without
the requirement to report the source of carbon offset credits, it is impossible for watchdog
agencies to ensure firms are achieving their carbon reductions in an ethical and socially
just way.
Accountability
The EU ETS was developed in response to the EU signing of the Kyoto Protocol
and is a significant, but not the only, instrument the EU uses to achieve Kyoto
compliance. As a single part of the EU’s overall climate policy, no formal Kyoto
mechanisms exist to hold the EU ETS accountable for emission reductions.
Nevertheless, the EU ETS is subject to indirect enforcement through the Kyoto
Protocol’s enforcement of Annex I countries treaty obligations. The Enforcement
Committee exists to monitor whether Annex I countries achieving the required emissions
reductions and mandating punishments for noncompliant countries. Consequences for
non-compliance consist of a requirement that the Annex I entity make up for the
difference in its emissions reductions deficit and an additional 30 percent reduction added

32
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on to the next commitment period33. Unfortunately, while the Enforcement Committee
can mandate these additional reductions, the Kyoto Protocol has no teeth to enforce
punishments or fees on non-compliant countries. Without a means of enforcing
punishment, no effective mechanism exists to hold the EU or the EU ETS as a whole
accountable for mandated emission reductions.
However, the EU ETS does have a system in place to enforce regulations on its
Member States. Directive 2003/87/EC lays out three avenues the EU ETS can use to
address Member State reduction deficiencies. The most important is the ability of the EU
ETS to implement a fine on non-compliant firms. Article 16 of that Directive gives
Member States the ability and the obligation to levy a fine on firms who do not surrender
enough emissions credits by April 30 to cover the preceding year. In addition to having
to surrender the necessary amount of emissions credits to account for the deficit, firms
are also required to pay a €100 fine on each one ton carbon credit not initially released34.
Firms that are non-compliant are also placed on a list that is published each year ensuring
relying on social pressure to present another effective instrument for inducing
compliance.
Responsiveness
The division of the EU ETS into phases both limits and enhances its ability to
respond to problems and changes in the market. It is limiting because it is difficult to
make changes in the program within a phase because the rules for that phase and the
market cap are set ahead of time. However, at the end of each phase it is mandatory that
33
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the EU ETS program be reviewed by the European Commission and regulatory changes
be enacted with each new phase. Phase III marks the beginning of a new ability to
respond to changes in market forces within phases with the creation of the Market
Stability Reserve which will become operational in January 2019. As discussed in the
previous section, the MRS neutralizes the negative effects of the pervasive allowance
surplus giving the EU ETS the ability to respond to future shocks in the allowance
market.
Final Remarks
Despite an initially fraught start to emissions trading in the EU ETS, the long
term prospects for the program are promising. As the EU continues to meet is Kyoto
mandated emissions reductions, the demand for EUAs will continue to grow as the
supply shrinks. While the move to increased auctioning could move to cover a greater
proportion of industries and firms without having to be concerned with carbon leakage,
this combined with the increase in flexibility from the MRS should help the EU ETS
respond to future shocks in the carbon market.
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The Clean Development Mechanism
Description
Like the EU ETS, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is an instrument
under the Kyoto Protocol designed to help participant countries achieve their abatement
requirements. Unlike the EU ETS, however, CDM projects are implemented in nonAnnex I countries that are not subject to a cap on their emissions levels. The CDM
consists of carbon abatement projects hosted in developing countries that sell one carbon
ton unit certified emission reductions (CERs) to developed, Annex I countries. The
CDM was designed to take advantage of the lower cost of reducing emissions in
developing countries. Unlike Annex I countries that, for the most part, have already
taken action to address the cheapest forms of mitigation, developing countries are still in
the infancy of adapting their industry and infrastructure to be more environmentally
friendly. This provides an opportunity for both developing and developed countries to
implement low cost carbon abatement programs in developing countries. Developing
countries can experience the benefits of localized pollution abatement and improvements
in production processes, while industrialized countries can purchase the lower cost
emissions reductions to achieve their Kyoto compliance goals. Developing countries also
have an advantage for cheap carbon abatement because of their geographical tendency to
have a higher percentage of land suitable for afforestation. This makes these countries
ideal for carbon capture and storage CDM projects where land is set aside to grow trees
for the creation of a carbon sink. As the planted trees grow and absorb carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere during photosynthesis, they contribute carbon abatement. The
amount of carbon being absorbed by the carbon sink trees can be calculated and then sold
Moors, 23

on the carbon credit market. In addition to cost-effective carbon abatement in Annex I
countries, the other expressed goal of the CDM is to promote sustainable development
within CDM host countries. Sustainable development lacks a precise definition but the
Rio +20 conference in 2012 established three “mutually reinforcing dimensions” that
ought to be promoted in the host countries by CDM projects: economic development,
social development, and environmental protection35. Examples of sustainable co-benefits
include new investment in production processes, the transfer of climate-friendly
technologies, a greater knowledge of environmentally friendly production processes, and
the creation of jobs and increased economic activity.
The CDM program operates under a project-based system in which an emissions
reductions or carbon offset project receives funding only if the project managers can
prove the “additionality” of the project. In this context, additionality means that the
emissions reducing project would not have occurred if funding wasn’t available through
CDM. Having additionality as a requirement promotes cost-effective emissions
abatement ensuring Annex I countries do not waste money financing improvements that
would have occurred anyway. Funding is provided by the issuing of CER credits that are
sold to firms and private actors in Annex-1 countries with the EU, under the EU ETS,
compromising 73 percent of the demand for CDM CERs36. Approval for a CDM project
is achieved through a multi-tier bureaucratic process that checks to confirm the project
fulfills the additionality requirement. The first step for project approval is assessment by
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a designated operational entity (DOE). The DOE is an auditor accredited by the CDM
Executive Board and connected to the firm that verifies project proposals checking for
feasibility, additionality, and code compliance. After approval by the DOE, the project is
passed along to the host country’s Designated National Authority (DNA). The DNA
determines if CDM project meets the requirements for additionality and checks to see if
the project promotes sustainable development. With no official system for measuring
sustainable development, DNAs must utilize their own best judgment to determine if a
project fulfills the approval criteria for a CDM project. After approval by the DNA, the
project then moves on to the final step of being evaluated by the international body, the
CDM Executive Board, which judges projects to ensure the voluntary participation of
every party involved and the achievement of measurable, additional emissions abatement.

Environmental Impact
From the beginning of its operation in 2002, the CDM has issued over 1.6 billion
CERs37 from almost 8,000 projects38 from host countries around the world. These CER
credits are purchased by firms in Annex I countries to offset their own emissions so that
they do not exceed their emissions limits. With the reductions in emissions from CDM
projects being turned over for use as allowances in industrialized countries, the CDM is
not actually designed to result in a net reduction in emissions on its own. Instead, the
CDM is designed as a tool that firms operating under cap and trade or voluntary systems
can use to achieve their target emissions levels cost effectively. This overall emissions
neutrality means that the additionality component of CDM requirements is especially
37
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important to ensure that CERs are an accurate reflection of the social cost of
carbon. If a CDM project is non-additional, then the Annex I firm purchasing the CERs
is paying for abatement that would have occurred anyway and wasting its money.
Unfortunately, the methods for determining and verifying project additionality are
problematic, leading to non-additional or questionable additionality in approximately 40
percent of registered CDM projects39. The process for determining additionality, codified
in the 2001 Marrakesh Accords, is a project specific “bottom-up” approach in which
project developers are responsible for developing the methodologies for determining
additionality. This approach was thought best because it allowed flexibility across
industries and types of projects and passed the costs of additionality assessment onto the
project developer. By making project developers bear the cost of additionality
assessment, however, the Accords created a system where project developers are not
incentivized to apply rigorous standards or undergo time-intensive data collection
processes. The current bottom-up system has resulted in a situation where only ten
percent of CDM projects demonstrated utilization of the recommended (but not required)
standardized assessment mechanisms outlined in the Marrakesh Accords40. The most
common tool for determining additionality and the simplest is to utilize a barrier analysis.
Using barrier analysis, firms set out to prove that they face “realistic and credible”
barriers that prevent the project from being implemented without CER credit revenue41.
Of the projects using barrier analysis to prove additionality, 38 percent do not provide
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evidence in their validation reports that the DOE has verified the presence of credible
barriers to the project activity42. Furthermore, 71 percent of small-scale projects and 39
percent of large-scale projects using the barrier analysis do not explain how CER revenue
would help overcome those barriers43. Another commonly utilized assessment
mechanism is a standard investment analysis using NPV, IRR, or unit cost of service
methods to demonstrate that the CDM project would financially unattractive without the
revenue from CER credits. Currently the use of investment analysis by project
coordinators is a fraught endeavor. A study by the Institute for Applied Ecology found
that only 45 percent of registered projects provided sufficient data and justifications of
assumptions for the results of the investment analysis to be replicable44. Finally, another
standard method of demonstrating project additionality is applying a “common practice
analysis” to demonstrate that elements of the project are not common practice within the
region or country. The key weakness of common practice analysis is the lack of a clear
definition of common practice. The CDM Executive Board itself has issued
contradictory statements on the parameters of what constitutes common practice. In
methodology AM0011 common practice is defined as project activities occurring in less
than five percent of similar cases, while in methodologies AM0041 and AM0044
common practice is more loosely defined as a process used in less than 33 percent of
firms with similar activates45. Common practice methodology is also problematic
because of the flexibility of what constitutes comparable practices or technology. Project
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developers manipulate the approval process by narrowly defining their project technology
to the degree that sufficiently few firms could be considered comparable or by broadly
defining the list of comparable firms/ projects so that the percentage of similar projects is
very small.
Part of reason for the pervasiveness of shoddy additionality justifications is the
CDM’s perverse incentive structure that makes the DNA responsible for verifying
additionality. The DNA benefits from maximizing the number of approved CDM
projects because of the prestige value of hosting CDM projects and the economic benefit
of an inflow of CER revenue. It is also far easier to give project proposals a cursory
review before approval than undergoing an exhaustive evaluation. With host country
DNAs not fulfilling their regulatory duties and no mandatory evaluation standards, the
CDM Executive Board is hard pressed to determine which additionality determining
methods are valid.
Another key issue in determining the environmental impact of the CDM is the
setting of a CDM project baseline level of emissions. The baseline describes the amount
of GHG emissions a firm would normally emit under a business as usual setting without
the CDM project. By subtracting the firm’s level of emissions with the project from this
baseline scenario, the firm’s level of emissions abatement is calculated and this amount is
converted into CER credits. It is imperative that the baseline be accurate to ensure that
the number of CERs being sold is an accurate reflection of total emissions reductions. If
the baseline is estimated as too high then the CER credits sold will allow firms in Annex
I countries to emit more than the emissions reductions CDM project actually produced
and net global emissions could actually increase. The Marrakesh Accords establish three
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ways of calculating a firm’s baseline level of emissions. A firm can utilize current and
historical emissions to project emissions levels, use emissions from the next
economically attractive option after CDM, or use data from similar projects. When
setting a baseline using comparable project data, the firm is obliged to restrict its
comparison to projects undertaken in the past five years that performed in the top 20
percent in the project category46. Each of these three methodologies is problematic and
changing from one methodology to another can yield substantially different baseline
estimates. In the case of using historical emissions data, the Marrakesh Accords do not
specify an appropriate time period from which historical data can be drawn. This
subjective method allows the firm to choose a historical time frame with the highest
emissions to ensure a high baseline. The historical levels of high emission could be due
to outdated, inefficient technology or from a period of unusually high demand that no
longer has any bearing on the present reality. The next method of comparing emissions
from the next economically attractive course of action is better in that it focuses on the
emissions from recently added plants and takes into account expected trends. This
method, however, is difficult to employ because of the numerous next best options from
which to choose. Typically used by new firms without a long history of emissions, the
last option of choosing a comparable firm is problematic because it gives the CDM
project developer substantial leeway to pick inappropriately high emitting firms. The
definition and scope of what category the CDM project falls in or what constitutes
comparable firms is largely up to the company’s discretion. This leaves room for the
company to manipulate the project definition so that the list of comparable firms is
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broader than it is in reality. The emissions levels of the top 20 percent of comparable
projects in this scenario are likely to be higher than they should be giving the company a
higher baseline than is appropriate47. Each of these three baseline assessment
mechanisms gives project developers substantial room to manipulate the CDM project
baseline to be artificially high. To compound the problem, the option to pick any of the
three mechanisms maximizes the chance that project developers can choose the baseline
that produces the highest possible amount of CER credits.
Ultimately, the problem inherent with trying to establish an accurate baseline is
that emissions baselines are counterfactual, using data from the past and present to try
and make predictions about the future. At the time the baseline is estimated, it is
impossible for the project developer to anticipate, with certainty, developments in clean
technology, changes in emissions demand from economic downturns (like in the case of
the EU ETS), the availability of substitutes products, or changes in regulation. All of
these could impact the business-as-usual scenario of the firm if it had not implemented
the CDM project. While the baseline for the CDM project is chosen at the beginning of
the project lifespan, it can have profound effects of the number of CER credits generated
for a long period of time. Under the Marrakesh Accords, project developers can choose
between a seven year crediting period which can be renewed twice for a total of 21 years,
or a single ten year period. With the seven-year renewable time period the baseline must
be renewed after each seven year period48. While many projects have lifespans
significantly longer than these periods, seven to ten years with an over allocation of
CERs is a significant time period given the urgency of reducing global emissions. The
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CDM Executive Board does recognize the problems inherent in the counterfactual
baseline and has incorporated language in the CDM Marrakesh rules specifying that
baselines should take “into account relevant national and/or sectoral policies and
circumstances”49. This means that firms are required to take into account the technology
and regulatory atmosphere when forecasting their business-as-usual emissions and
calculating their baseline. Given the interest national governments and DNAs have in
ensuring CER revenue, however, this requirement runs the risk of creating a perverse
incentive structure. Host countries might be incentivized to neglect clean technology or
increase environmental regulation in order to not lose investment revenue from CER
sales. To ensure this is not the case, the Executive Board created the E+/E- tool. In this
context, E+ refers to a policy that privileges emissions-intensive technologies while Ereferences policies that favor the adoption of less emission-intensive technologies50. To
ensure that host countries are not incentivized to adopt policies favorable to increased
emissions, the CDM Executive Board rules that such policies can only be accounted for
in the baseline calculation if they were in place prior to the adoption of the Kyoto
Protocol in 1997. In contrast, E- policies can only be excluded in establishing a baseline
scenario if they have been implemented since the adoption of the Marrakesh Accords in
2001. Given the amount of time that has passed since the implementation of the
Marrakesh Accords, the E- rule needs to be updated to reduce the risk of over-crediting
and double counting of emissions reductions. While the threat of perverse policy
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incentives is real and destructive, the more immediate problem is the perverse incentive
of firms to exaggerate their baseline emissions.
Economic Impact
Integral to the functioning of the CDM as a project based mechanism is the
achievement of an equilibrium carbon price for CER credits. CER prices ought to be low
enough to offer firms in Annex I countries a way to cost-effectively offset their emissions
but high enough to sufficiently fund carbon abatement projects in the developing world.
Achieving the ideal equilibrium price involves a complex interplay of supply and
demand. The supply of CER credits comes from CDM certified emissions reductions in
developing countries. The demand for CERs originates from Annex I countries operating
under mandatory or voluntary emissions caps that seek to take advantage of the lower
costs of abatement in developing countries. Because of the different costs of abatement,
it is cheaper for industrialized countries operating under a cap to buy emission reduction
credits through the CDM than from firms within the industrialized country. The most
cost-effective way therefore for firms in Annex I countries to meet their emissions
reductions requirements is to maximize the proportion of CER abatement credits
compared to more expensive Annex I emissions credits such as EUAs. The problem
currently facing the CDM mechanism is an oversupply of allowances relative to demand.
The cause of this shortfall in demand is new regulations in Annex I cap and trade systems
the limit the number of CER credits firms can use for emissions abatement. Historically,
the EU under the EU ETS has been the largest source of CER demand purchasing 66.4
million CERs before 201451. At the beginning of the third phase of the EU ETS,
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however, the EU Commission implemented new rules restricting the amount of CERs
firms can exchanges for EUAs. Part of motivation for these restrictions stems from the
EU ETS’s own troubles with regulating supply and demand within the system, while
another part of the Commission’s incentive derives from the problems with verifying that
CERs represent real, additional emissions reductions discussed in the previous section.
EU regulations up to 2020 specify that stationary installations may utilize international
credits up to the higher of two limits: the international credit entitlement specified in the
national allocation plan or 11 percent of the total freely allocated allowances. For
installations who are new participants in the EU ETS, the Commission mandates that
international credits may represent a maximum of 4.5 percent of their total verified
emissions in phase 3. Finally, aircraft operators may use international credits up to 1.5
percent of their total verified emissions in phase 352. The EU Member States also agreed
at the 2011 Durban COP that after 2012 the only new project CER credits that would be
accepted into the EU ETS would need to originate from Least Developed Counties
(LDCs) even though the current largest producers of CERs, China (80 percent) and India
(five percent), do not qualify for this label53. Compounded with the repeal of Australia’s
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) and the eight percent limit54 on offset
credits in the California Cap and Trade Program, the CDM is currently facing a large
shortfall in demand for CERs. This imbalance between supply and demand has caused
the market CER price to decline dramatically from €20 per ton of carbon abatement in
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2008 to only €0.40 in 201355. With the restrictions on Annex I CER demand and the
subsequent drop in CER prices, the CDM is currently in crisis and in need of substantial
reform if there is to continue to be a Kyoto mechanism for emissions reductions in
developing countries.

Social Impact
Examining the social impact of the CDM is especially important given the
location of projects in developing countries where the populations are the most
vulnerable and the least enfranchised. The CDM is supposed to be an instrument to
promote sustainable development and sponsor regional co-benefits. CDM projects,
however, can produce varied social side effects depending on the level of stringency of
the DNA. The Marrakech Accords place the responsibility for defining whether a project
contributes to sustainable development in the hands of the host country. With no
international standard for verifying sustainable development, each DNA must come up
with its own criteria for evaluating project documentation. Most DNAs utilize checklists
and multi-criteria methods to evaluate project design documents (PDDs). This method is
problematic for several reasons. Firstly, PDDs are written by the project developer
whose incentives are to obtain approval for the project, not provide sustainable cobenefits. At no time is the DNA or the DOE required to follow up to implementation of
co-benefits so the sustainable development claims of the PDD could be very different
than reality. This method is also an inefficient means of judging sustainable development
because it is not holistic. Host countries are only required to verify the documentation for
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positive co-benefits of the project, not investigate the negative side effects of a CDM
project on local communities. With these weak institutional criteria, it is not surprising
that no project has ever been rejected as a result of not meeting sustainable development
criteria56.
The type of project is an important factor in determining the social impacts of
CDM project. Representing 26 percent (i.e 2,228 projects) of all CDM projects
registered and 27 percent of CER credits issued in 2011, hydropower projects are the
most common type of CDM project57. Lauded by national governments as sources of
clean, cheap energy and drivers of economic growth, hydropower projects, financed by
CDM and development agencies, have become increasingly popular in recent years.
Unfortunately, the ramifications of building a hydropower dam can be extremely harmful
to local communities. According to the United Nations Environmental Programme
(UNEP) CDM Database, 41 percent of hydroelectric CDM projects have the potential to
have negative social impacts on local communities58. With 188 CDM dam projects
registered by 2011, India has one of the highest concentrations of CDM projects in the
world. The majority of these projects occur in poor, rural regions in the North59. In
many of the registered CDM projects in these areas, project developers do not obtain the
prerequisite “prior and informed consent” from project shareholders leaving affected
villages no voice in the decision making process that led to the destruction of their
homes. For example, the Lepcha people were excluded from the decision making
process that placed dams along their sacred Teesta River the North Sikkim district. The
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blasting and tunneling for the dam caused water sources in the hills to dry up and led to
severe landslides that destroyed several houses near the dam site60. The Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) submitted for the Teesta dam project did not take into account
the damaging impacts on the Lepcha people or the ecological, seismic, or reduced flow
impacts from the blasting. With the Indian DNA not holding CDM hydroelectric projects
accountable for their social impacts, the Lepcha people are left without direct access to an
institutional means of changing their situation. Hydroelectric CDM projects are not
designed to align incentives so the DNA will stringently test for equitable sustainable
development. One reason for this is the general profitability of hydroelectric projects.
With large upfront costs, hydroelectric projects typically rely on barrier analysis to prove
that the costs of construction would be prohibitive without funding from CERs. Despite
high investment costs, many of these installations would prove profitable in time
(indicated by a net positive NPV), thus failing a strict test for additionality. Hydroelectric
projects therefore allow the developing country to profit twice-- first from CER sales and
then from the sale of energy generated at the plant. Incentives to protect against the
negative impacts of hydroelectric projects are also not scale aligned in that the impacts of
the CDM project tend to be localized while the interests of the DNA are broad
encompassing the entire country. Only a small segment of the population usually isolated
and not powerful, is directly affected by the dam project while the benefits are diffuse.
To the developing country’s administration the prestige and spread out benefits outweigh
the isolated costs to the people at the dam site.
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Another type of CDM project liable to cause negative social impacts is the
creation of carbon sinks. Although forestry projects represent only a 0.8 percent of CDM
projects, the severe problems they impose on local populations makes them an important
aspect to consider when evaluating the effectiveness of CDM projects61. Like
hydroelectric projects, carbon sinks tend to be land intensive making them vulnerable to
land grabbing and the abuse of customary user/ ownership rights. This problem is
particularly prevalent in African nations where CDM is a relatively recent tool lacking
the institutional infrastructure and the firmly established land use rights to protect local
peoples. African countries also constitute the majority of the list of LDCs that will
continue to be allowed to sell CERs to the EU ETS post-2012. The long term viability of
CDM projects and the relative abundance of unclaimed forestry land make African
countries especially vulnerable to project developers seeking to make a profit at the cost
of the local population. The Norwegian company Green Resources is one example of a
carbon offsetting, plantation forestry firm whose projects have a detrimental impact on
the local population. Operating in Mozambique, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, the
company owns 45,000 hectares of standing forest making them the largest carbon
forestry company operating in Africa62. The company currently holds two 50-year
licenses in Uganda for the Bukaleba Forest Reserve (5,780 ha) and the Kuchung Forest
Reserve (2,099 ha). Both sites necessitated a series of evictions and bans on forestry
agriculture to qualify as CDM projects. Ugandan national land laws acknowledge
indigenous peoples access and user rights to their customary lands but grants priority to
protecting corporate land licenses. In the case of the Bukaleba and Kuchung lands owned
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by Green Resources, the company claimed CER verification was dependent on
preventing encroachment on the licensed land. In 2004, the Ugandan government chose
to uphold Green Resource’s plantation borders and began evicting locals and destroying
crops the locals had planted among the tree saplings63. A 2011 expansion of Green
Resource’s planting area expanded the eviction area exacerbating the locals’ problems.
Forcing locals off of their ancestral lands has impacts beyond the immediate impacts on
the villagers themselves. In the case of Green Resources, some villagers were inspired to
fight back burning down sections of the planted trees in protest. For others that move,
there is potential for increased conflict in other regions as displaced groups are forced to
move into other land being used by other groups. This increases the chances of
intergroup conflict as displaced populations are forced to incur on other groups’ land.
Transparency
The CDM suffers from unique transparency issues due to its structure as a project
based system operating at local and international levels. The CDM Executive Board
mandates the organization of meetings with accredited observers, the publication of all
decision making documents and forms, the publication of the reasons for a project
rejection, and the existence of an appeal process for revised projects that were originally
rejected at any stage of the process64. This process gives buyers and project developers
access to the decision making process of the CDM Board but, fails to incorporate project
stakeholders. Members of the local communities affected by CDM projects do not have
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the same access to resources or information as other participants in the CDM process.
This lack of access is particularly damaging because local communities are the most
likely to be negatively impacted by a CDM project. The Executive Board requires that
project developers consult with local stakeholders regarding “requests for registration
issuance, deviations, revision of monitoring plans, new methodologies proposals,
revisions of an approved methodology, and clarification on an approved methodology or
an approved tool”65. Although these consultations are a mandatory part of the project
registration process, this does not mean they are actually carried out. Again,
responsibility for stakeholder consultation lies with the project developer and verification
of the consultation is provided in the PDDs written by the developer. It is easy for
project developers to misreport consultation in order to obtain project approval. When
this occurs, there are limited channels for affected communities to communicate their
concerns. Because of the limited access of the poor, rural communities most likely to be
affected by CDM projects, it is necessary for there to be higher standards of transparency
for stakeholder consultation. Publishing reports and rulings online is an insufficient
measure when affected communities are likely not to have internet access. Instead,
stakeholders must be kept informed via in-person consultations and information must be
communicated in a format local communities can understand rather than formal, technical
reports.
Accountability
For the CDM, the question of accountability encompasses two dimensions of
responsibility- 1) a responsibility to the buyers of CERs to ensure the credits being
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purchased are reflections of additional, real, and verified emissions reductions and 2) a
responsibility to the local stakeholders of CDM projects to ensure that the impacts of
CDM projects are included in the cost benefit analysis of a CDM project. On both
dimensions of accountability, the CDM falls short. As discussed in the environmental
impact section above, the institutional mechanisms and incentive structures to ensure
project additionality simply do not exist in the CDM architecture. The primary
responsibility for verifying the additionality of a project lies with the host country DNA,
who has little incentive to turn down projects that bring in significant revenue and
prestige. The methods for determining additionality are flexible and give the project
developer significant ability to manipulate project data to receive the most amount of
CERs possible. With these limitations, buyers in Annex countries cannot be certain that
the CERs they are purchasing reflect true emissions reductions and that they are not
funding projects that would have occurred without their assistance. The same
institutional weaknesses that make it difficult to verify additionality also make it easy for
project developers to get away with projects that negatively impact the local populations.
DNAs are only required to consult project documents to verify sustainable development
not to investigate the actual situation at the project site. The project documents are
written by the project developer who can simply list the positive impacts the project may
or may not have without accounting for the costs to local communities. Projects that tend
to generate the most CERs also tend to have the least sustainable co-benefits66. Because
project developers only generate revenue from emissions reductions, not from sustainable
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development, there is no incentive structure in place to ensure local communities benefit
from CDM projects.
Responsiveness
Like the issue of transparency, responsiveness of the CDM depends largely on
host countries’ effectiveness at consulting with local shareholders. Given the problematic
protocols for initial shareholder consultation, it is especially important that the host
country’s DNA or the Executive Board be able to respond to concerns or complaints by
local communities. Unfortunately, the same issues that make initial consultation unlikely
to occur, make responding to the problems that arise from CDM projects difficult.
Because the project developer only reports on the positive actions it is taking for
sustainable development, the negative impacts often go unrecognized (unless an NGO
becomes involved) and unresolved.
Final Remarks
Although the CDM plays a valuable role in the global carbon market, the
mechanism had proven to be deeply flawed. Placing control over project design and
verification in the hands of interested parties creates a perverse incentive structure for
CDM project developers and DNAs. This incentive structure, combined with a lack of
necessary oversite, motivates CDM project developers to exaggerate the amount of
emission reductions achieved and ignore the negative social externalities caused by their
projects. With the supply of emissions reductions in developing countries unreliable,
purchasers in Annex I countries cannot be certain the CER credits they purchase to offset
their own emissions actually cover the entire emissions amount. With the demand for
CER credits drying up and subsequent reduction in project, it is not even certain that the
Moors, 41

CDM will be able to continue to operate. Given detrimental problems that are
fundamental to the architecture of the CDM, it is worth exploring alternative approaches
to valuing carbon in the developing world. One promising proposal currently being
debated is, instead of counting emissions reductions based on a baseline specific to a
particular firm, CERs could be calculated by comparing firm emissions to industry
standards. Firms with an emission’s intensity less than the industry average would
receive credits based on how far below the average emissions per production unit the
firm’s emissions fell. While this intensity-based crediting system raises some of the same
question about comparable industries and projections of future industry activity as the
CDM’s current format, this system would prevent firms from manipulating their
emissions baselines to the same extent and would not punish firms who had been
historically low emitters.
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REDD and REDD+67
Description
The UNFCC’s program Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation (REDD) was conceived amidst growing concern over the role of forestry
initiatives in carbon abatement programs. Between 1990 and 2000 deforestation
proceeded with a net loss of 8.3 million hectares forestry land per year. After the turn of
the century, this rate improved but proceeded apace with an average net loss of 6.2
million hectares per year up to 201068. The majority of this forest loss occurs in tropical
forests in developing countries creating devastating impacts on biodiversity and the
livelihood of forest-dependent communities. This degradation is also responsible for
approximately 10 percent of total global carbon emissions69. These concerns led the
Coalition for Rainforest Nations fronted by Papua New Guinea to propose REDD as a
mechanism incentivize forest preservation in 2005. The idea of including deforestation
initiatives was debated during the Kyoto Protocol talks, but ultimately not implemented
due to concerns over carbon leakage from deforestation simply shifting from one area to
another and difficulties in accurately measuring and verifying carbon emission
reductions. Although these challenges remained a concern support for deforestation
initiatives remained strong in developing countries and the REDD proposal was taken up

67 Because of the lack of date characterizing the REDD+ mechanism, the discussion in this chapter focuses
on the known institutional factors influencing the different REDD+ impacts. With this discussion making
up the bulk of the chapter, a separate discussion of institutions factors (transparency, accountability, and
responsiveness) is impractical and any claims made about these factors would be unable to be supported.
For these reasons, this chapter excludes a discussion on institution variables.
68
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in 2007 by the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in Bali (COP-13)70. In its
original form, REDD was an interagency program, of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), designed encourage
developing country to tackle reducing emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation. In 2010, as part of the Cancun Agreements at COP-1671,72, REDD’s
mandate was expanded to include the aims of the conservation of forest carbon stocks,
sustainable management of forest, and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks. The
addition of these directives created the REDD- plus (REDD+) mechanism within the UNREDD program. By expanding the REDD program’s prerogative, the conference
participants hoped to prevent REDD from developing into a mechanism that rewarded
only historically high emitters/ deforesters. If only reducing emissions from deforestation
was rewarded, then countries with historically low emissions or deforestation would not
be incentivized to preserve their low rates. Promoting conservation and sustainable forest
management also has the potential to provide significant co-benefits to local communities
if they are properly compensated for adopting sustainable practices. While rewarding
good practices is an essential part of any climate mitigation mechanism, figuring out how
to reward conservation in REDD+ is a challenging process that is bound to present
problems is calculating emissions reductions.
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REDD+ projects cover more than 28.7 million hectares of forested land in
developed countries around the world. Geographically, 53 percent of projects are located
in Latin America, 26 percent in Asia, and 21 percent in Africa. Although Latin America

Source: UN-REDD Programme

leads in the number of projects, Asian REDD+ projects cover the greatest area. 37
percent of project land is in Asia, 33 percent in Africa, and 30 percent in Latin America73.
The map below shows the countries participating in REDD+ programs.

The mechanisms for funding the REDD+ program were decided in 2011at the
COP-17 in Durban, South Africa. REDD+ activity can be funded by either voluntary
funds or from private sources that treat REDD+ as a source carbon offset credits.
Voluntary funding could originate from a national or international level with both the
governments of developed countries and international development funds pledging to
provide financing for REDD+. To date, donor country contributions amount to $215.2
million of which 91 percent is directed to supporting UN-REDD partner countries at the
73

Nhantumbo, Isilda, and Marisa Camargo. "REDD+ for Profit or for Good?" IIED Natural Resource
Issues, 2015., 35

Moors, 45

national and regional levels74. This support takes the form of promoting “REDD+
readiness” developing the institutions to ensure “good governance, stakeholder
engagement, safeguards and multiple benefits, and monitoring, reporting and
verification”75. The first phase of a developing country’s REDD+ program is devoted to
this capacity building supported by public grants. By the end of the first phase,
participating countries must provide a national emissions reference level or a forest
reference level, a robust and transparent plan for forest monitoring, and a system of
safeguards to prevent negative externalities76. Only in the second phase of a national
REDD+ strategy are the strategies developed the first phase implemented and projects
begin. These projects can be funded by either private sources or public grants. By
allowing dual sources of funding the REDD+ program grants project flexibility to pursue
efficient emissions reductions and sustainable co-benefits. Projects sourced by private
sector agents are more likely to focus on generating revenue from emissions while
projects funded by non-profits or government agencies are more likely to support local
communities. Currently with most participating countries in phase two of REDD+, the
private sector and NGOs lead in REDD+ implementation funding 35 percent and 36
percent of projects respectively. Eight percent of projects are led by public actors while
11 percent are funded by partnerships between sectors77. Most participating countries
have yet to enter phase three. A country moves on from phase two only after five years
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have passed since REDD+ was initially adopted. This phase involved evaluating current
REDD+ projects and institutional mechanisms and adapting necessary changes.
Environmental Impact
Assessing the impacts of REDD+ as a mechanism is difficult because the program
is still in its infancy. Most countries are still in the midst of phase two of the program
and have yet to publish the data needed to assess the impacts of REDD+ projects. While
it is difficult to gain a full picture of the impacts of REDD+ as a whole, it is possible to
examine the institutional structure of the program and evaluate the results of some of the
older projects to draw conclusions about the overall environmental impacts. Many of the
environmental issues facing the EU ETS and the CDM also apply to the REDD+
program. One of the greatest of these challenges is ensuring that the emissions
reductions achieved by the program are real and measurable. This is particularly
challenging for the REDD+ program because it seeks to reward continuance of good
behavior. Without a standard of “bad behavior” it is difficult to measure what effects
REDD+ funding has on the behavior of forest users. REDD+ revenue could truly
incentivize good forestry practices or it could make no difference on the behavior of
resource users and simply be viewed as a nice source of additional cash. To ensure that
funding goes to projects that provide real emissions reductions, the REDD+ program has
strict requirements for participant country’s Measurement, Reporting and Verification
(MRV) systems that monitor changes in forest carbon stocks and flows and set
baselines78. This is particularly challenging for a forestry program such as REDD+.
Measuring carbon flows involved quantifying the complex interplay between the amount
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of carbon absorbed by the forest and the emissions produced forestry activities, not
simply measuring levels of past emissions like in the case of CDM projects. Forests also
cover broad swaths of land while forestry usage and carbon flows vary across areas. To
gain an accurate picture of the carbon capacity and flow in a forest area it is therefore
necessary to implement community-based monitoring is linked to spatial analyses. This
requires substantial bureaucratic cooperation and necessitates the involvement of the
forest communities whose carbon impact is being monitored and recorded. The
coordination of this data collection can present high transaction costs. In Thailand, the
local governments conflict with the central government and donors on what are seen as
infringements on their local authority by independent MRV agencies. Past emissions
data is scattered across different departments and not being shared between branches.
Locals also are not incentivized to provide accurate depictions of land use habits in the
fear of inspiring increased regulation79. Some success has been found, however, in
engaging local communities through a program organized by the World Agroforestry
Center (ICRAF) Southeast Asia Program through the Trees in Multi-Use Landscapes in
Southeast Asia project called rapid carbon stock appraisal (RaCSA)80. The RaCSA
program aims to engage local communities in recording forestry activities offering means
to improve local livelihoods through funding improved practices. With the right
incentive structures in place, it is possible to cooperate with local communities to gain
accurate depictions of carbon impacts of forestry activities. Because the responsibility
for baseline setting lies in the hands of national governments, who receive dedicated
financing from international UNFCC funds instead of private developers, the REDD+
79
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mechanism does not fall prey to the same perverse incentive structure as the CDM. This
does not necessarily mean, however, that the REDD+ program’s emissions baselines are
more accurate. The means for calculating the forestry baseline are significantly more
complicated that either the EU ETS or the CDM and involve higher implementation
costs. With funding from the UNFCC and expert support from partner institutions such
as NASA, Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research (INPE) and the US Geological
Survey81, it is possible for the REDD+ program to ensure real, accurate, and measurable
emissions reductions from forestry management.
Another problem facing the REDD+ mechanism is the potential for carbon
leakage. This can occur if the constriction of forestry and deforestation activities from
REDD+ in one area causes the perpetrators of these activities to simply shift their
production to other unprotected areas. If these effects are not accounted for in the
calculation of emissions reductions credits, then the credits purchased from the forest
preservation project are not accurate reflections of real reductions and global emissions
can actually increase. Evidence from the Peruvian Amazon corroborates the possibility
of this phenomenon. Observed rates of deforestation in and around newly established
protected areas showed that while deforestation within the parks decreased, deforestation
rates in the surrounding areas actually increased82. Of key importance to preventing
carbon leakage is extending protection to as much areas of the relevant forest area as
possible. The national governments of developing countries have significant power to
extend protection from national level REDD+ programs to vast swaths of forest limiting
81
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the amount of carbon leakage that can occur within the country. Brazil experience
success with this approach under the Governors’ Climate and Forests Taskforce (GCF)
REDD+ program. Beginning in 2008, seven out of nine83 Amazonian states have
implemented plans to limit deforestation under the National Plan for the Prevention and
Control of Deforestation in the Amazon84. The program is financed through a
combination of NGO support and the participation of observer states, Catalonia,
California, and Illinois, who integrate the emissions reductions from deforestation into
their GHG reduction plans85. Local politics present a particular challenge when dealing
with carbon leakage. In implementing REDD+ deforestation regulations, a district faces
a loss of tax revenue and the risk of deterring business investment in the area. Holding
out from implementing deforestation regulation allows a district to benefit economically
as forestry business moves from regulated areas to unregulated. Shifts of this kind must
be included in the calculations for emissions reduction from deforestation initiatives or
emissions reductions cannot be counted as real or measurable.
Economic Impacts
Unlike the EU ETS or the CDM, the REDD+ carbon finance mechanism is as yet
too untested to determine how the program’s emissions credits fit in to the global carbon
market equilibrium. Many REDD+ project have yet to begin generating substantial
emissions credits and data about the purchase of those credits has yet to be analyze in any
significant way. Without examining how the market values of the emissions reductions,
it is difficult to judge the economic efficiency of the mechanism. Taking this approach is
83

The two non-participating state, Amazona and Acre, have both independently passed laws regulating
deforestation increasing the effectiveness of the program
84
Angelsen, 103
85
GCF Task Force

Moors, 50

not necessarily a good measure of the program’s economic value. Because of its mission
of reducing carbon emissions from forestry activity, the REDD+ mechanism is not
designed to achieve emissions reductions at the least cost. There are other, less costly
ways to achieve equivalent emissions reductions. Instead, REDD+ developers designed a
program that required more initial investment but aimed to achieve real, measurable
emissions reductions and sustainable co-benefits.
In total, assuming the achievement of a 50 percent abatement of forest-related
emissions by 2020, the Eliasch Review estimated the global costs of REDD+ to be
between 17 and 33 billion dollars per year86. The opportunity costs of implementing
REDD+ depend on the country or region doing the implementing and the types of
forestry activates that would have occurred had REDD+ not been adopted. For regions
with lucrative economic forestry activates the opportunity cost would be very high.
Meanwhile, for some regions protected under REDD+ programs but not being utilized for
forestry activities, the opportunity cost would be zero. For Indonesia, regional
opportunity costs range from $0.49 per ton of carbon for smallholder farming in Sumatra
to $19.6 per ton for the protection of degraded forest land typically used in the production
of palm oil87. A significant advantage of the REDD+ mechanism is that it allows actors
to choose protection policies or projects that have the lowest opportunity cost. For
example, the opportunity cost for completely eliminating deforestation in the Brazilian
Amazon is estimated to be $1.49 per ton of carbon reduced. The price of decreasing
deforestation to only 94 percent of projected levels is projected to be less than half that at
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$0.76 per ton of carbon eliminated88. At the point where reducing emissions becomes
prohibitively expensive, program participants can always chose to cease abatement and
instead pursue the profitable alternative activity.
Social Impacts
Like the CDM, the REDD+ mechanism contains the dual missions of reducing
carbon emissions and promoting sustainable development in developing countries. It is
especially important to pay attention to the social impacts of the REDD+ mechanism
given the type of communities likely to be effected by REDD+ regulation. Of the 1.2
billion people characterized as living in extreme poverty, 90 percent rely directly on
forest resources for their livelihoods89. These people depend on forests as sources of fuel,
food, medicines and shelter. These poor, rural populations also tend to have the least
voices in national politics and the least access to the means of appealing decision about
land use. It is therefore especially important that the institutional mechanisms to protect
the rights of local communities be integrated into the REDD+ program. The Forest
Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the REDD+’s Guidelines on Stakeholder
Engagement mandate that project developers obtain the free, prior and informed consent
(FPIC) of local communities before project implementation90. Division of the benefits of
REDD+ projects ought to be shared between project developers and local stakeholders as
defined by carbon rights agreements. While most project developers do seek to engage
local stakeholders, there is no enforceable way of ensuring that the consultations reported
in project documents actually take place. In one study only 23 percent of project
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documents stated that communities were likely to receive a cash share of the carbon
credits, with only 16 percent explaining how these benefits would actually be
distributed91. What truly matters in ensuring REDD+ programs do not cause negative
social externalities, is a strong system granting ownership or user rights to forestry
communities. These systems of forestry rights function independently of the REDD+
mechanism and vary from host country to host country.
Final Remarks
Although the exact impacts of the REDD+ mechanism are yet to be known, it
seems likely that the emission reduction credits produced by REDD+ projects will be
real, measurable, and without extreme negative externalities. The positive incentive
structures and increased oversight established in the REDD+ mechanism will help the
program avoid the same pitfalls as the CDM. Where the REDD+ mechanism seems
likely to fall short is in the amount and the cost of the emissions reductions achieved in
the program. The process for accounting for reduced emissions for deforestation is more
complicated than other methods and involves higher transaction costs. Thanks to
international funding providing an additional source of finance for the program, the
higher implementation cost should not impede REDD+ from being widely adopted by
developing countries.
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Conclusion
Ultimately each emissions abatement mechanism is designed to operate under
different national circumstances. The CDM and REDD+ mechanisms both are targeted
at achieving emission reductions in developing countries without mandatory abatement
levels. Because these countries do not have the mandatory incentive structures to fund
abatement measures on their own, these systems must rely on outside funding, such as the
EU ETS and other mandatory/ voluntary emissions trading systems, to finance abatement
projects. The REDD+ program relies on both private finance and international public
funding to achieve emissions reductions through forestry initiatives while the CDM funds
projects through the incentive of CER revenues. The differences in funding create
different incentive structures. With the resource of international funding, REDD+
programs will still profits from projects that provide significant co-benefits and thus can
afford to have higher standards for sustainable development than the CDM. To incentive
improved sustainable development in the CDM mechanism, greater international scrutiny
must be applied to CDM projects to incentivize project developers to avoid negative
social externalities. Facing a shortfall in demand from changing standards in the EU
ETS, the CDM , and REDD+ to a lesser extent, most find additional sources of funding
for abatement projects. Some of this will be provided from more and more countries
adopting emissions reduction requirements but, more international funding would also
prove useful to improving the program.
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